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Executive Summary 
If current trends continue, the population of the United States will rise to 
438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and 82% of the increase will be 
due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to 2050 and their U.S.-born descendants, 
according to new projections developed by the Pew Research Center. 
Of the 117 million people added to the population during this period due to the 
effect of new immigration, 67 million will be the immigrants themselves and 50 
million will be their U.S.-born children or grandchildren. 
Among the other key population projections: 
• Nearly one in five Americans (19%) will be an immigrant in 2050, 
compared with one in eight (12%) in 2005. By 2025, the immigrant, or 
foreign-born, share of the population will surpass the peak during the last 
great wave of immigration a century ago. 
• The major role of immigration in national growth builds on the pattern of 
recent decades, during which immigrants and their U.S.-born children and 
grandchildren accounted for most population increase. Immigration’s 
importance increased as the average number of births to U.S.-born women 
dropped sharply before leveling off.  
• The Latino population, already the nation’s largest minority group, will 
triple in size and will account for most of the nation’s population growth 
from 2005 through 2050. Hispanics will make up 29% of the U.S. 
population in 2050, compared with 14% in 2005. 
• Births in the United States will play a growing role in Hispanic and Asian 
population growth; as a result, a smaller proportion of both groups will be 
foreign-born in 2050 than is the case now. 
• The non-Hispanic white population will increase more slowly than other 
racial and ethnic groups; whites will become a minority (47%) by 2050. 
• The nation’s elderly population will more than double in size from 2005 
through 2050, as the baby-boom generation enters the traditional 
retirement years.  The number of working-age Americans and children 
will grow more slowly than the elderly population, and will shrink as a 
share of the total population. 
The Center’s projections are based on detailed assumptions about births, deaths 
and immigration levels—the three key components of population change. All 
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these assumptions are built on recent trends. But it is important to note that these 
trends can change. All population projections have inherent uncertainties, 
especially for years further in the future, because they can be affected by changes 
in behavior, by new immigration policies, or by other events. Nonetheless, 
projections offer a starting point for understanding and analyzing the parameters 
of future demographic change.   
The Center’s report includes an analysis of the nation’s future “dependency 
ratio”—the number of children and elderly compared with the number of 
working-age Americans. There were 59 children and elderly people per 100 adults 
of working age in 2005. That will rise to 72 dependents per 100 adults of working 
age in 2050. 
The report also offers two alternative population projections, one based on lower 
immigration assumptions and one based on higher immigration assumptions.  
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A Note on Terminology 
The terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” are used interchangeably in this report.  
The terms “whites” “blacks” and “Asians” are used to refer to the non-Hispanic 
components of each population.  
“Children” refers to people ages 17 and younger. 
“Working-age” refers to people ages 18 64. 
“Elderly” refers to people ages 65 and older. 
“Foreign-born” refers to an individual who is not a U.S. citizen at birth or, in 
other words, who is born outside the U.S., Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories 
and whose parents are not U.S. citizens. The terms “foreign-born” and 
“immigrant” are used interchangeably.  
The terms “unauthorized immigrants,” “undocumented immigrants” and “illegal 
immigrants” are used interchangeably. 
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This report uses the following definitions of the first, second and third-and-higher 
generations: 
First: Foreign-born or immigrant. 
Second: U.S. native (born in the United States or territories), with at least one 
first-generation parent. 
Third-and-higher: U.S. native (born in the United States or territories), with 
both parents native-born. 
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Overview 
If current trends continue, the demographic profile of the United States will 
change dramatically by the middle of this century, according to new population 
projections developed by the Pew Research Center.1  
The nation’s population will rise to 
438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 
2005, and fully 82% of the growth 
during this period will be due to 
immigrants arriving from 2005 to 2050 
and their descendants. (Figure 1) 
Of the 117 million people added to the 
population during this period due to the 
effect of new immigration, 67 million 
will be the immigrants themselves, 47 
million will be their children and 3 
million will be their grandchildren. 
The Center’s projections indicate that 
nearly one in five Americans (19%) will 
be foreign born in 2050, well above the 
2005 level of 12%, and also surpassing 
the historic peaks for immigrants as a 
share of the U.S. population—14.8% in 
1890 and 14.7% in 1910. 
(Figure 2) 
By 2050, the nation’s racial 
and ethnic mix will look quite 
different than it does now. 
Non-Hispanic whites, who 
made up 67% of the population 
in 2005, will be 47% in 2050. 
Hispanics will rise from 14% 
of the population in 2005 to 
29% in 2050. Blacks were 13% 
                                                     
1 The projections are based on a starting point of 2005, and build up to 2050 in five-year increments, so do not include totals 
for individual years. The Census Bureau’s most recent national population estimate, for July 1, 2007, is 301.6 million, 
and was released on Dec. 27, 2007. 
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of the population in 2005 and will be roughly the same proportion in 2050. 
Asians, who were 5% of the population in 2005, will be 9% in 2050.  
Immigration is 
projected to be the key 
driver of national 
population growth in 
the coming 
half century, but it is 
important to note that 
possible future changes 
in immigration policy 
or other events could 
substantially alter the 
projected totals. These 
projections are based on 
trends over the past 
half century, during 
which immigration, 
both authorized and 
unauthorized, has played an escalating role in U.S. population growth. From 1960 
to 2005, new immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants accounted for 51% of 
population increase. In the later part of that period, from 1980 to 2005, new 
immigration accounted for 58% of the 68 million additional people. 
For the period from 2005-2050, new immigrants and their descendants will 
account for 82% of population increase. The contribution of new immigration to 
population change was derived by comparing our main projection with an 
alternative projection that assumes no new immigrants arrive after 2005. (See 
Contribution of Immigration to Population Change in Appendix.) 
The heightening role of immigration contrasts with a decrease in fertility in recent 
decades. The average number of births per woman has declined markedly since 
the late 1950s, from more than 3.5 then to about 2 now. Also, a smaller proportion 
of women are of childbearing age now, compared with earlier decades. These two 
changes have made immigration a more prominent factor in population growth.  
Methods and Assumptions 
The Center’s projections for the period from 2005 to 2050 are based on detailed 
assumptions about patterns in births, deaths and immigration—the three building 
blocks of population change.  (See Methodology Box and Appendix.)  All 
population projections have built in uncertainties, especially for years further in 
the future, because they are based on assumptions about future behavior. In 
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addition, these uncertainties can multiply because key aspects of population 
change are often interrelated—for example, a decline in immigration could also 
lead to a decline in the birthrate because immigrants tend to have larger families 
than do native born residents. 
The Center has developed three different population projections for 2050, but the 
body of this report presents findings from the main projection (figures from 
projections based on lower or higher immigration levels are set forth in a section 
that starts on page 23).  These projections consolidate and build upon past trends, 
present conditions, and factors affecting future behavior.   
None of the projections should be treated as predictions.  The country’s policies 
may change, as may the factors that influence birth, death and immigration rates. 
Even given these caveats, however, population projections are an important 
analytical tool for planners. A rise or decline in the overall population—as well as 
in particular age groups—will have important impacts on the nation’s tax base 
and workforce. Demographic change has major implications for government 
spending in key areas such as schools, health programs, community services, 
infrastructure and Social Security. Projections also provide business with a basis 
upon which to make judgments about future markets. And they are of increasing 
interest because of the role that population may play in climate change and other 
environmental concerns. 
 
A Note on Methodology 
The Center’s projections use well established demographic methods and models 
to carry the population forward in time. The models and assumptions are 
disaggregated by race and by Hispanic origin, as are many projection models 
(e.g., Census Bureau, 2000). With regard to immigration, the Center’s projections 
also incorporate methods developed by Edmonston and Passel (1992, 1994) that 
differentiate the population by generation, i.e., the first generation (foreign-born), 
the second generation (U.S. natives with at least one immigrant parent) and the 
third-and-higher generations (U.S. native children of two U.S. native-born 
parents). For more detail, see the  “Methodology” Appendix to this report. 
 
When incorporating birth estimates into the projections, the Center has assumed 
that the overall fertility rate will remain near the level it has been for the past three 
decades, with differing rates by race and ethnicity (Appendix, Figure A2). 
Birthrates are assumed to be well above average for immigrants, slightly above 
average overall for the second generation (U.S. natives with at least one 
immigrant parent) and below average for subsequent generations born in the 
United States. The Center’s fertility rate projections are virtually identical to those 
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of the Social Security trustees and slightly lower than those of the Census Bureau. 
(Census Bureau, 2004; Social Security Administration, 2007). 
As for death rates, life expectancy is assumed to improve somewhat for all groups 
throughout the period covered by these projections. (Appendix, Figure A3) The 
Center’s projections employ Census Bureau assumptions about life expectancy 
gains, which are higher than those of the Social Security Trustees. 
 Immigration to the United States has risen rapidly and steadily for decades as a 
result of increasing globalization and population movements, changes in 
U.S. immigration laws, the growing linkages of immigrant families within this 
country to communities abroad and labor market factors. Not only have the 
numbers of new U.S. immigrants increased over recent periods, but the rate of 
immigration also has risen steadily, whether measured from 1930, 1960 or 1980. 
In the face of these strong and persistent trends, most U.S. government 
projections, whether done by the Census Bureau (1996, 2000, 2004) or the Social 
Security Administration (2007) have assumed constant or even decreasing 
numbers of immigrants, implying sharp and sometimes immediate declines in the 
rate of immigration. As a result, official projections over the last several decades 
have consistently underestimated actual population growth. 
The Pew Research Center projections have assumed that the annual immigration 
level, now about 1.4 million people, will increase slowly by 1% per year, reaching 
2.1 million 
immigrants 
in 2050. 
(Figure 3)  
This rate of 
growth is in 
line with, 
but 
somewhat 
slower than, 
the growth 
trends of the 
last several 
decades. 
These 
immigration 
levels are 
slightly 
higher than 
those 
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projected by either the Census Bureau or the Social Security Trustees in the short 
run and substantially higher toward the end of the projection horizon. 
With the Center’s immigration assumption, the rate of immigration remains 
roughly constant over the 45-year projection horizon at 0.48% per year, or just 
under five immigrants per 1,000 population for each year. The rate is slightly 
below the rate for the first half of this decade and equal to the average for the last 
35 years. (Figure 4)  
 
The decades-long pattern of steady increases has been interrupted recently by  
year-to-year variation, including a spike in 1998-2001, a sharp decline in 2002-
2004 (Passel and Suro, 2005), followed by a return to the long-term average in the 
last several years. The relatively steady growth of the last 70 years contrasts with 
substantial fluctuations that occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
(Figure 5)  
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Short-term fluctuations are likely to continue to occur, but the Center’s 
projections assume that those variations will be less important than the long-term 
trends. Although the rate is held steady in the Center’s projections, the number of 
new immigrants rises as the nation’s total population goes up. The projections 
also assume that several hundred thousand foreign-born residents will leave each 
year, which is in keeping with trends of the past several decades. Reflecting 
recent trends, the Center’s projections include a mix of new arrivals of legal 
permanent residents and unauthorized, or illegal, migrants, although the two 
groups are not broken out separately.  
The issue of illegal immigration has become highly contentious in recent years. 
Last summer, Congress tried but failed to pass a comprehensive reform bill, and 
the debate over how to change immigration policies has become a major topic of 
the current presidential campaign. It is possible that a future Congress will enact 
laws that would sharply cut immigration flows. This has happened before. The 
Immigration Act of 1924 (along with an economic depression and a world war) 
drastically reduced immigrants as a share of the U.S. population from a 20th 
century peak of 14.7% in 1910 to a low of 4.7% in 1970.  
This report offers two alternative population projections in addition to its main 
projection. The alternatives are based on immigration levels roughly 50% above 
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and 50% below the baseline projection, but use the same fertility and mortality 
assumptions as the baseline projection. Under the lower-immigration scenario, the 
population would rise to 384 million in 2050, and new immigration would 
account for 71% of growth during the projections period. Under the 
higher-immigration scenario, the population would go up to 496 million, and new 
immigration would account for 87% of the increase. The baseline projection 
shows the population will rise to 438 million, and new immigration will account 
for 82% of the increase. 
Population Trends 
The Center’s main projection indicates that the nation’s population will grow 48% 
over the 2005–2050 period. That growth rate is lower than the 64% increase in the 
nation’s population from 1960 through 2005. The projected annual growth rate of 
0.9% equals that of the 1980s but is lower than the pace of growth during other 
decades since the 1960s. 
The Center’s projections also indicate that between 2005 and 2050 the number of 
elderly will increase more rapidly than either the number of children or 
working-age adults.2  Immigration and births to immigrants in the United States 
will be responsible for all growth of other age groups but will have little impact 
on the number of elderly, which is affected mainly by the aging of the post-World 
War II baby-boom generation.  
The relationship between the size of the working-age population, on the one hand, 
and the young and elderly on the other hand, is sometimes referred to as a nation’s 
“dependency ratio.” The Center’s projections show that the dependency ratio, 
which was 59 young and elderly for every 100 people of working age in 2005, 
will rise to 72 dependents per 100 people of working age in 2050. That means the 
costs per worker to support the young and elderly would go up. Under a 
lower-immigration scenario, the ratio would rise even higher, to 75 dependents 
per 100 people of working age. Under a higher-immigration scenario, it would be 
69 dependents per 100 working-age people.  
In terms of international comparisons, the United States will continue to be the 
world’s third most populous nation in 2050, behind India and China, each with 
more than a billion people (United Nations, 2007). The projected annual growth 
rate for the United States will continue to exceed that in most other developed 
nations, which are growing at a slower pace, if at all. European countries 
generally are growing at no more than 0.5% a year, and some are losing 
population. 
                                                     
2 Working age adults are defined as 18–64 years old. 
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As is true in the United States, the immigrant populations in many other 
developed nations have been growing rapidly in recent decades. The United States 
has a larger foreign-born population than any other country, but U.S. immigrants 
were a smaller share of the 2005 population (12%) than those in a few countries 
with long histories of receiving immigrants—including Australia at 20% or 
Canada with 19%  (United Nations, 2006). Although immigrants are a larger 
share of the U.S. population than in most of Europe, some countries have a share 
of immigrants approaching that of the United States, including France (11%) and 
the United Kingdom (9%). 
This report begins by presenting the baseline projection for the total population 
from 2005 to 2050. The next sections go into detail about the projected estimates 
for key segments of the population, including the foreign born, Hispanics, blacks, 
Asians, non-Hispanic whites, working-age adults, children and the elderly. This 
report then examines how these changes will affect the size of the potential 
workforce relative to the number of elderly and young people. A final section 
presents the results of two alternative projections.  This overview concludes with 
a summary of major projections. 
Racial and Ethnic Groups 
In the Center’s projections, each person is included in only one race or Hispanic 
category. These projections assume that definitions of race and ethnic 
categories will remain fixed and that self-identification does not change over 
time. In reality, the growing numbers of births to parents of different racial and 
ethnic groups, as well as changing social norms about racial and ethnic 
self-identification, are serving to blur the boundaries of racial/ethnic categories. 
Consequently, the future sizes of race/ethnic groups could be higher or lower 
than the projection values even if the underlying demographic assumptions 
about the future prove to be correct. 
Key Projections 
Population and Immigration 
• Between 2005 and 2050, the nation’s population will increase to 
438 million from 296 million, a rise of 142 million people that represents 
growth of 48%.  
• Immigrants who arrive after 2005, and their U.S.-born descendants, 
account for 82% of the projected national population increase during the 
2005–2050 period.  
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• Of  the 117 additional people attributable to the effect of new immigration, 
67 million will be the immigrants themselves and 50 million will be their  
U.S.-born children and grandchildren 
• The nation’s foreign-born population, 36 million in 2005, is projected to 
rise to 81 million in 2050, growth of 129%. 
• In 2050, nearly one in five Americans (19%) will be an immigrant, 
compared with one in eight now (12% in 2005). 
• The foreign-born share of the nation’s population will exceed historic 
highs sometime between 2020 and 2025, when it reaches 15%. The 
historic peak share was 14.7% in 1910 and 14.8% in 1890. 
• Births in the United States will play a growing role in Hispanic and Asian 
population growth, so a diminishing proportion of both groups will be 
foreign-born. 
Racial and Ethnic Groups  
• The Hispanic 
population, 
42 million in 
2005, will rise 
to 128 million in 
2050, tripling in 
size. Latinos 
will be 29% of 
the population, 
compared with 
14% in 2005. 
(Figure 6) 
Latinos will 
account for 60% 
of the nation’s 
population 
growth from 
2005 to 2050.  
• The black population, 38 million in 2005, will grow to 59 million in 2050, 
a rise of 56%. In 2050, the nation’s population will be 13.4% black, 
compared with 12.8% in 2005. 
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• The Asian population, 14 million in 2005, will grow to 41 million in 2050, 
nearly tripling in size. In 2050, the nation’s population will be 9% Asian, 
compared with 5% in 2005. Most Asians in the United States were foreign 
born in 2005 (58%), but by 2050, fewer than half (47%) will be. 
• The white, non-Hispanic population, 199 million in 2005, will grow to 
207 million in 2050, a 4% increase. In 2050, 47% of the U.S. population 
will be non-Hispanic white, compared with 67% in 2005. 
Age Groups 
• The working-age population—adults ages 18 to 64—will reach 
255 million in 2050, up from 186 million in 2005. This segment will grow 
more slowly over the projection period (37%) than the overall population. 
Future immigrants and their descendants will account for all growth in this 
group. 
• Among working-age adults, the foreign-born share, 15% in 2005, will rise 
to 23% in 2050. The Hispanic share, 14% in 2005, will increase to 31% in 
2050. The non-Hispanic white share, 68% in 2005, will decline to 45% in 
2050. 
• The nation’s population of children ages 17 and younger will rise to 
102 million in 2050, up from 73 million in 2005. The child population will 
grow more slowly in future decades (39%) than will the overall 
population. Future immigrants and their descendants will account for all 
growth in this population segment. 
• Among children, the share who are immigrants or who have an immigrant 
parent will rise to 34% in 2050 from 23% in 2005. The share of children 
who are Hispanic, 20% in 2005, will rise to 35% in 2050. Non-Hispanic 
whites, who make up 59% of today’s children, will be 40% of children in 
2050. 
• The nation’s 
elderly 
population—
people ages 65 
and older—will 
grow to 
81 million in 
2050, up from 
37 million in 
2005. This 
group will grow 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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more rapidly than the overall population, so its share will increase to 19% 
in 2050, from 12% in 2005. (Figure 7) Immigration will account for only a 
small part of that growth.  
• The dependency 
ratio—the number 
of people of 
working age, 
compared with the 
number of young 
and elderly—will 
rise sharply, 
mainly because of 
growth in the 
elderly 
population. There 
were 59 children 
and elderly people 
per 100 adults of 
working age in 2005. That will rise to 72 dependents per 100 adults of 
working age in 2050. (Figure 8)  
Alternative Projection Scenarios 
• Under a lower-immigration scenario, the total population would rise to 
384 million, the foreign-born share would stabilize at 13% and the 
Hispanic share would go up to 26% in 2050. 
• Under a higher-immigration scenario, the total population would rise to 
496 million, the foreign-born share would rise to 23% and the Hispanic 
share would go up to 32% in 2050. 
• Under a lower- or higher-immigration scenario, the dependency ratio 
would range from 75 dependents per 100 people of working age to 
69 dependents per 100 people of working age. Both of these ratios are well 
above the current value of 59 dependents per 100 people of working age. 
 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050 12 
Population Projections  
Between 2005 and 2050, the nation’s population is projected to rise by 
142 million, an increase of 48%. During those 45 years, it will expand from 
296 million to 438 million. By contrast, the U.S. population rose by 116 million 
people between 1960 and 2005, which was a 64% increase. 
Nearly all of the increase from 2005 to 2050 will be due to new immigrants and 
their U.S.-born descendants. They will account for 82% of the nation’s population 
growth, or 117 million additional people by 2050. Of those new residents, 67 
million will be the immigrants themselves, 47 million will be their U.S.-born 
children and 3 million will be their U.S.-born grandchildren. That means new 
immigrants themselves will account for 47% of population growth during the 
projections period. 
 Only 25 million of the growth over the 2005–2050 period, or 18%, can be 
attributed to the resident population in 2005 and its descendants. 
The Center’s population totals, calculated in five-year increments, were based on 
underlying demographic assumptions about births, deaths and immigration. They 
combine to yield an average annual growth rate of 0.9% over the 45-year horizon 
of the projections.  
The nation’s annualized growth rate has been somewhat higher than that in recent 
years, with upturns in the 1960s that resulted from high fertility and in the 1990s 
that mainly reflected 
elevated immigration 
levels. The Center’s 
projections show somewhat 
less variation in future 
growth rates, because of 
underlying assumptions 
that immigration levels will 
rise slowly and that fertility 
will be stable. Under this 
scenario, the nation’s 
population would double in 
80 years. (Figure 9)  
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Foreign-born Population 
The nation’s foreign-born population, 36 million in 2005, is projected to rise to 
81 million in 2050. The 129% rise during the 2005–2050 period is a sharper 
increase than for the population overall. In 2050, nearly one in five Americans 
(19%) will be an immigrant, compared with one in eight now. (Figure 10) 
The number of foreign-born 
residents in the United States 
already is at a record number 
but is a somewhat smaller share 
of the population than a century 
ago. The foreign-born 
population was 12% of the total 
in 2005.3  At its previous peak, 
the percentage of foreign-born 
residents fluctuated from 13% 
to 15% for 60 years between 
1860 and 1920 (Gibson and 
Jung, 2006 and Figure 2).  
Pew Research Center projections indicate that 
the proportion of immigrants will exceed 
historical highs (14.7% in 1910 and 14.8% in 
1890) sometime between 2020 and 2025, 
when 15% of the population will be foreign 
born.  
Because most people immigrate as 
working-age adults, the foreign-born 
population is more heavily concentrated in the 
18–64 age group than is the native population. 
In this country, about four out of five 
immigrants (81%) are ages 18–64. That share 
will decline slowly as the foreign-born 
population ages, reaching 73% in 2050. By 
contrast, only 60% of native-born residents 
were ages 18–64 in 2005, a share that will 
decrease to 55% by 2050. Thus, the 
foreign-born share of the working-age 
                                                     
3 The foreign born population was 12.7% of the total in 2007, according to the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey. 
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population will grow to 23% in 2050 from 15% in 2005. 
Immigrants’ children and grandchildren born in the United States will account for 
all growth in the population ages 17 and younger. Most children of immigrants 
are born in the United States (about four of five) and therefore are U.S. natives. 
For this reason, the number of foreign-born children will remain relatively low 
throughout the projection period.  
Very few people immigrate at older ages, so new immigration will have little 
immediate impact on the size of the elderly population. However, as younger 
immigrants age into the elderly group, they will make up a growing share of that 
population. In 2050, 16 million of the projected 81 million elderly will be foreign 
born, about 20%; in 2005, only 10% of the 37 million elderly were foreign born. 
(Figure 11) 
Racial and Ethnic Groups 
Hispanic  
The Hispanic population, 42 million in 2005, will rise to 128 million in 2050, 
tripling in size. Latinos will be 29% of the population, compared with 14% in 
2005.4  As the fastest growing major race or ethnic group, the Hispanic 
population will account for 60% of the nation’s growth during the 2005–20
period. (Figu
50 
re 12) 
                                                     
New immigrants and their 
descendants account for 
most of the projected 
Latino growth (74%), but 
the growth is mainly due to 
births in the United States. 
However, the Latino 
population is relatively 
young and has a higher than 
average fertility rate, so its 
growth would continue to 
outpace that of other groups 
even without new 
immigration. Growth of the 
current Hispanic population 
will add 22 million new U.S. residents by 2050, a 52% increase.  
4 The Latino population in 2007 was 47 million, based on the Census Bureau’s October Current Population Survey, and 
Hispanics were 15.5% of the total population. 
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Although the Hispanic population will grow more quickly than the total number 
of U.S. residents, its growth rate will moderate—from 3.1% per year for 2005–10 
to 2.0% per year for 2045–50. The reduced growth rate will be due, in part, to the 
increasing proportion of the Latino population born in the United States, because 
U.S.-born Hispanics have lower fertility rates than do first-generation Hispanics.  
The Hispanic population already is mainly U.S. born (60%), and that proportion is 
projected to rise (to 67% in 2050) because of changes in the sources of growth. In 
a reversal of past trends, the number of births to Latino women will grow more 
rapidly than the number of new Latino immigrants. For a period of three decades, 
beginning in the early 1970s, new Hispanic immigrants had considerably 
outnumbered births to Latino mothers. As a result, the percent foreign-born 
among Hispanics increased from only 14% in 1960 to 40% in 2005. 
However, this pattern of Latino births and immigration shifted during the current 
decade: From 2000 to 2005, there were more Hispanic births than new 
immigrants. The Center’s projections are that Hispanic births will grow much 
more rapidly than Hispanic immigration, so that by 2045–50 there will be almost 
twice as many Latino births as new Latino immigrants.  
Accompanying this change will be a substantial shift in the generational 
composition of the Hispanic population. By 2050, the foreign-born share will 
drop to 33%. The second generation, which represented 23% of Hispanics in 1960 
and has grown to 28% in 2005, will continue to increase. In 2050, 34% of 
Hispanics will be U.S.-born 
children with at least one 
immigrant parent. 
The third-and-higher 
generations had accounted 
for a majority of Hispanics 
in 1960 (63%), but this had 
dropped to 32% in 2005 
due to the large influx of 
immigrants. But as the 
share of births to U.S.-born 
Latinos increases, the 
third-and-higher 
generations will continue to 
grow. By 2050, all three 
generational groups of 
Hispanics will be roughly 
the same size. (Figure 13) 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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Non-Hispanic Race Groups 
From 2005 to 2050, the 
black population will grow 
by about 56%, but as a 
share of the nation’s 
population it will be 
stable.5 By 2050, the 
nation’s population will 
13% black, about the same 
share as in 2005. In 2000
the Hispanic and bla
populations were nearly the 
same size; by 2005, the 
number of Hispanics 
(42 million) exceeded the 
size of the black population 
(38 million). The gap will 
continue to grow because 
of sustained Latino immigration. In 2050, there will be more than twice as many 
Hispanics as blacks (128 million compared with 59 million). (Figure 14) 
be 
, 
ck 
                                                     
The Asian population will 
grow almost as fast as the 
Hispanic population in 
percentage terms, almost 
tripling from 14 million in 
2005 to 41 million in 2050. 
(Figure 15) In 1960, Asians 
represented a minuscule 
0.6% of the total 
population. By 2005, the 
share of Asians had grown 
to 5%; by 2050, it will be 
9%. Nearly all of the future 
growth in the Asian 
population (94%) will be 
due to immigrants arriving 
after 2005 and their 
descendants. But arrivals of new immigrants will play a declining role in Asian 
population change, and births in the United States to immigrants and their 
5 All race groups are non-Hispanics only. 
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descendants will play a growing role. In 2005, most Asians in the United States 
(58%) were foreign born; by 2050, fewer than half (47%) will be foreign born. 
(Figure 16) 
The white non-Hispanic 
population will grow much 
more slowly than any of the 
other groups because of low 
fertility rates and relatively 
low immigration. It is 
projected to rise by only 
8 million, or 4%, over the 
45-year period, with little 
change after 2025. As a 
result, the non-Hispanic 
white population’s share of 
the total will continue the 
decrease that has occurred 
since 1960, when 85% of 
the population was white, 
non-Hispanic. By 2005, the 
share had dropped to 67% 
and it will decrease steadily 
to 51% in 2040 and 47% in 
2050. (Figure 17) 
Age Groups  
Working-age Adults 
The working-age 
population—adults ages 18 
to 64—will reach 
255 million in 2050, up 
from 186 million in 2005. 
That is a 37% increase, a 
rate somewhat lower than 
for the population as a 
whole. At that time, 
working-age adults will be 
58% of the population, 
down from 63% in 2005. (Figure 18) 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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Future immigrants and 
their descendants born 
in the United States 
account for all growth 
in the working-age 
population over this 
period, adding 
76 million people to the 
2050 size of this group. 
Absent new 
immigration, there 
would be a decline of 
7 million people in this 
group. 
Because immigration 
plays such a prominent 
role in future growth of 
the working-age population, the share of foreign-born residents in this segment 
will rise to 23% in 2050, compared with 15% in 2005. The Hispanic share of 
working-age adults, 14% in 2005, will more than double, to 31% in 2050. The 
non-Hispanic white share, 68% in 2005, will decline to 45% in 2050. (Figure 19) 
It is important to note 
that not all working-age 
adults are in the labor 
force. Currently, more 
than three-quarters in 
the 18-to-64-age group 
are, but that could 
change depending on 
many economic and 
demographic factors. 
For example, a greater 
share of workers ages 
50 and older may 
choose to stay in the 
labor force. Also, 
foreign-born Hispanic 
women now are much 
less likely to be in the 
work force than either U.S.-born Hispanic women or other U.S.-born women. If 
education levels of foreign-born Hispanic women continue to increase and their 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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fertility continues to fall, their low labor force participation rates could increase, 
as has happened with other groups. 
Children 
The nation’s child population will rise to 102 million in 2050, from 73 million in 
2005. The 39% increase is somewhat slower than for the population as a whole. 
Children will make up 23% of the population in 2050, compared with 25% in 
2005. 
Even though the projected increase in the child population is relatively modest, it 
stands in marked contrast to the much slower growth during the previous 45-year 
period (1960–2005). In 1960, there were 65 million children ages 17 and younger, 
making up more than a third (36%) of the population. That number grew by only 
14%, to 73 million (or 25% of the population), in 2005. The slow growth during 
those years reflects the aging of the post-World War II baby boom, a period of 
high birthrates that lasted from 1946 to 1964. The baby-boom babies are now 
middle-aged adults, and the first of them will turn 65 years old in 2011.  
All of the projected increase in the population ages 17 and younger through 2050 
will be due to the arrival of new immigrants and the children born to them in the 
United States. By 2050, 36 million children will be descendants of immigrants 
who arrived after 2005. Absent new immigration, there would be a decline of 
8 million people in this age group. 
Immigrants do not generally arrive as children, nor do immigrant families tend to 
bring large numbers of children with them from other countries. Instead, the 
pattern is that young adults immigrate and have children after they arrive. 
Consequently, the vast majority (94%) of these 102 million young people in 2050 
will be born in the United States.  
Because immigrants on average have more children than native-born U.S. 
residents, the share of U.S. children who are children of immigrants—the first and 
second generations combined—will increase. In 2050, one child in three (34%) 
will be an immigrant or the son or daughter of an immigrant, compared with 
almost one in four (23%) in 2005. 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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The share of children 
who are Hispanic will 
rise markedly, from 
20% in 2005 to 35% in 
2050. Non-Hispanic 
whites, who made up 
59% of children in 
2005, are projected to 
be 40% of children in 
2050. (Figure 20) 
Elderly 
The nation’s elderly 
population—people 
ages 65 and older—is 
projected grow to 
81 million in 2050, 
from 37 million in 
2005. This group will grow more sharply than other segments because of the 
aging of the generation born during the post-World War II baby boom. The last of 
the baby boomers turns 65 in 2029. Among all age groups, projections about the 
size of the elderly population are least uncertain because the vast majority already 
are part of the U.S. population. 
The elderly have accounted for 12% to 13% of the population since 1990; this 
range is higher than at any time in the nation’s history. With each successive 
decade, the percentages will increase so that by 2050 the elderly will represent 
19% of the population. By way of comparison, in Florida, the state with the 
highest proportion of elderly residents, 17% are in that age group today (Census 
Bureau 2006). 
The proportion of Hispanics in the elderly population will almost triple, from 6% 
to 17%, between 2005 and 2050 but will be substantially less than the proportion 
of Hispanics in younger age groups.  
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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The racial/ethnic 
composition of the 
elderly population will 
change as the overall 
population does, but the 
changes lag behind 
those of younger age 
groups. Thus, 
non-Hispanic whites 
will remain a majority 
of the elderly, but their 
share will drop 
markedly to 63% in 
2050, compared with 
82% in 2005. The 
proportions of other 
race groups in the 
elderly population will 
increase over the projections horizon. The share of blacks will grow from 8% in 
2005 to 12% in 2050; the share of Asians will grow from 3% to 8%. (Figure 21) 
Dependency Ratio 
The dependency ratio is a demographic and economic indicator that compares the 
size of non-working-age groups—children and the elderly—with that of the 
working-age population.6  A higher number of elderly or children relative to the 
number of workers translates into higher costs per worker to pay for all 
government programs, including those targeted at the young and old such as 
schools and Social Security.  
In 2005, there were 59 elderly people and children for every 100 Americans of 
working ages. In 2050, assuming current trends continue, that dependency ratio 
will rise to 72. The main reason for the increase is that the elderly population will 
grow more rapidly over the next four decades than the working-age population. 
Most of the increase in the number of elderly will occur by 2030 as the 
baby-boom generation enters the retirement years. The ratio of children to 
working-age people, on the other hand, will change little. 
The elderly dependency ratio was 20 people ages 65 and over for every 
100 people ages 18 to 64 in 2005. That ratio has risen slightly since 1960 (from 
16 per 100) and will increase rapidly (to 32 per 100) until 2030, when the 
                                                     
6 A true “dependency” ratio would compare workers with non-workers.  Projections of this kind of ratio would require 
additional assumptions about future labor force participation levels. 
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youngest of the baby boomers turns 66. The elderly dependency ratio will level 
off at 32 elderly per 100 people of working age through 2050.  
A very different pattern emerges with regard to the child dependency ratio. It is 
projected to be stable in coming decades, at about 40 children for every 
100 people of working age. The major driver of this ratio is not the level of 
immigration but the average number of children per woman, which is projected to 
change little in the future. 
To understand how fertility affects the child dependency ratio, consider that in the 
late 1950s, when women had an average 3.7 children, there were 65 children per 
100 working-age Americans. By the mid 1970s fertility had dropped, and it has 
remained at about two 
children per woman for 
the past two decades.7  
As a consequence the 
child dependency ratio 
dropped to 42 child
per 100 people of 
working age b
ren 
y 1990. 
                                                     
The current dependency 
ratio is lower than it has 
been for decades. It was 
81 in 1960, during the 
post-World War II baby 
boom, and has been 
declining since then. 
(Figure 22)  
7 That rose to 2.1 in 2006, but it remains to be seen whether that increase will persist. The projections allow for that 
possibility. 
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Alternative Scenarios 
This section examines 
how the population 
would change if 
immigration levels were 
lower or higher than 
current trends. The 
baseline projection for 
the overall population is 
438 million in 2050. 
That could range from 
384 million under a 
lower-immigration 
scenario, to 496 million 
if higher immigration 
levels prevailed. 
(Figure 23) 
This baseline projection 
assumes annual 
immigration, authorized 
and undocumented, of about 1.4 million people a year, rising to 2.1 million by 
2050; annual immigration would average 1.7 million per year over the entire 
2005–2050 period. An alternative lower-immigration scenario assumes that levels 
would average about half that amount, or 900,000 per year; a higher-immigration 
scenario assumes that levels would average about 50% higher, or 2.6 million a 
year over the 45-year projection period. 
These three immigration scenarios use the same mix of birth and death rates by 
age, race and ethnicity, but the projected numbers of births and deaths is a 
function of the projected population size.  
Foreign Born. The nation’s foreign-born population, which numbered 36 million 
in 2005, would grow to 49 million in 2050 even under a lower-immigration 
scenario. The proportion foreign born in the total population would stabilize at 
roughly the current level (12% to 13%). 
Under a higher-immigration scenario, the foreign-born population would rise to 
115 million by 2050, compared with 81 million under the baseline scenario. 
Instead of making up nearly one in five Americans (19%), as the baseline 
projection envisions, immigrants would be nearly one in four (23%). Under the 
baseline scenario, the foreign-born proportion of the population would exceed the 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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historic high by 2025; under the higher-immigration scenario, that would happen 
by 2015, when it would reach 15%. 
Hispanic. The nation’s Hispanic population, numbering 42 million and accounting 
for 14% of U.S. residents in 2005, would grow sharply under all immigration 
scenarios. Under the baseline projection, it would more than triple by 2050, 
reaching 128 million, or 29% of the total population. 
Even under a lower-immigration scenario, the Hispanic population would more 
than double, reaching 98 million in 2050, or 26% of all U.S. residents. Under the 
higher-immigration alternative, the Latino population would increase to 
159 million in 2050, or 32% of total residents. 
Working Ages. Turning to the 
impact of immigration on different 
age groups, the scenarios diverge 
markedly after 2030 for 
working-age adults. (Figure 24) 
The baseline projection is that the 
number of adults ages 18 to 64 will 
rise from 186 million in 2005 to 
255 million in 2050. The 
working-age population, now 63% 
of the total, would decline to 58%. 
Under a lower-immigration 
scenario, the size of the potential 
labor force would grow to 
219 million in 2050. Under a 
higher-immigration scenario, the 
population ages 18 to 64 would 
rise to 293 million. The 
working-age share of the 
population will not be affected 
significantly by the assumed level of future immigration. This group would 
account for about the same share of the total population (57% to 59%) under all 
three projections.  
Children. For the child population, the baseline projection shows that there will be 
102 million Americans younger than 18 in 2050, making up 23% of the 
population. That compares with 73 million, and 25% of the population, in 2005.  
Under a lower-immigration scenario, the number of children would rise to 
85 million and the proportion would be 22%. Under a higher-immigration 
scenario, the number would rise to 120 million and the share would be 24%.  
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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Elderly. The size of the elderly population, 37 million in 2005, would be the least 
affected by differing immigration scenarios because few people migrate at older 
ages and some older immigrants leave. The number of elderly, 81 million in 2050 
under the baseline scenario, would be 80 million under the lower-immigration 
alternative and 83 million under the higher-immigration alternative.  
Dependency Ratios. 
The overall dependency 
ratio, which was 
59 youths or elderly for 
every 100 people of 
working age in 2005, 
will rise to 72 in 2050 
under the baseline 
projection. It would be 
slightly higher, 75, 
under the 
lower-immigration 
scenario, and slightly 
lower, 69, under the 
higher-immigration 
scenario. (Figure 25) 
The projected youth 
dependency ratio—that 
is, the number of 
children ages 17 and 
younger per 100 people 
of working age—would be relatively stable and change only slightly under 
differing immigration scenarios. It was 40 in 2005 and will stay in the range of 39 
to 41 under all three scenarios.  
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
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The elderly dependency 
ratio is little affected by 
the assumed level of 
future immigration. As 
a result, the number of 
elderly people 
compared with the 
number of working-age 
people would rise 
substantially under all 
scenarios. The ratio 
would go up sharply 
until the youngest baby 
boomer reached 66 in 
2030. In 2005, there 
were 20 elderly per 
100 people of working 
age, which will rise to 
32 under the baseline 
projection. Under the lower-immigration scenario, the ratio would reach 36 by 
2050. Under the higher-immigration scenario, the ratio would be only slightly 
lower, 29 in 2050. (Figure 26) 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
Overall Methodology 
National projections are usually done with what is called the cohort-component 
model in which the initial population is carried forward into the future by adding 
new births, subtracting deaths, adding people moving into the country 
(immigrants), and subtracting people moving out (emigrants).  The model used 
for the Pew projections is is a variant of the cohort-component method modified 
to incorporate immigrant generations by Edmonston and Passel (1992). In this 
application, five generation groups for U.S. residents are defined: (1) the 
foreign-born population, or the first generation; (2) the Puerto Rican-born 
population8; (3) the U.S.-born population of foreign (or mixed) parentage, or the 
second generation; (4) the U.S.-born population of Puerto Rican (or mixed) 
parents; and (5) the U.S-born population of U.S.-born parents. In simplifying to 
three generations, the third-and-higher generations group is defined as 
U.S. natives born to U.S.-native parents and is the sum of groups 2, 4 and 5.  
In the projection methodology, each of the five generation groups is carried 
forward separately. Immigrants and emigrants enter and leave the first generation; 
migrants from Puerto Rico enter (and leave) the Puerto Rican-born population. 9  
Births are assigned to generations based on the generation of the mother and a 
matrix allowing for cross-generational fertility. All births to first-generation 
women are assigned to the second generation; all births to the Puerto Rican-born 
population are assigned to the Puerto Rican parentage population.  Most births to 
the second and third-and-higher generations are assigned to the third-and-higher 
generations, but some are assigned to the second generation to allow for 
mixed generation couples that include immigrants. Likewise, most births to 
women of Puerto Rican parentage are assigned to the third-and-higher generation, 
but some are assigned to the Puerto Rican parentage population to allow for 
mixed couples including Puerto Rican-born migrants. The generational 
assignment matrix (or G-matrix) is based on race/ethnic origin but is allowed to 
vary dynamically based on relative generational sizes. 
For these projections, the entire population is divided into five mutually exclusive 
racial/ethnic groups: Hispanic origin; white, not Hispanic; black, not Hispanic; 
Asian and Pacific Islander, not Hispanic; and American Indian/Alaska Native, not 
                                                     
8 About 5% to 15% of this population is persons born in other outlying areas and territories of the U.S. (including Guam and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands).  We use this terminology for consistency with other sources and because of the dominance of 
the Puerto Rican population. 
9 Other small components of change measure persons who enter (and leave) the second and third-and-higher generations.  
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Hispanic. The report also includes a historical analysis using data developed with 
the same projection methods and estimates of the demographic components. The 
components are estimated so as to reproduce as closely as possible the decennial 
censuses from 1960 to 2000 and the 2005 population by age, sex, race/Hispanic 
origin and generation. The projections and historical analyses use five-year age 
groups up to 85 years and older by sex. The projections are done for five-year 
time steps from April 1, 2005 to April 1, 2050. 
The remainder of this section describes the underlying data and assumptions for 
the projections and historical analyses. The first section treats the assumptions for 
the major demographic components of immigration, fertility and mortality for 
2005–2050, with a particular emphasis on immigration. The next section presents 
the methods for defining and measuring the racial/ethnic groupings and the 
generational groups. Within each section, the data and the methods used to define 
the historical population and components of change are described. A more 
detailed treatment of the overall methods and especially the historical analysis is 
available (Passel, 2004). 
Demographic Components 
Demographic components of population change account for all additions and 
subtractions from the national U.S. population. Births and deaths are the largest of 
the components, but measurement of immigration is far more complicated 
because there are multiple channels of entry to and exit from the U.S. population. 
For some of the components, such as legal immigration, the available data are 
better, and accurate measurement is easier than for others, such as unauthorized or 
illegal immigration. The measurement methods differ among the immigration 
components, in part because of the nature of the data and in part because some of 
the immigration concepts dictate particular methods. 
The demographic components included in the population projection model are: 
Births (or fertility rates) 
Deaths (or mortality rates) 
Immigration  
Legal Immigration (including refugees and legalized aliens) 
Net Undocumented Immigration 
Emigration 
Net Movement from Puerto Rico 
Other Immigration Components 
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Immigration 
The immigration assumptions are critical for both the prospective projections and 
the historical analyses. Immigration increased substantially over the 1960–2000 
period with particularly large increases for Hispanics and Asians. The rapid 
growth in the Hispanic population is attributable principally to immigrants and 
their descendants.  
Background 
Immigration has been the most difficult demographic component to forecast in the 
last several decade. It is directly affected by national policies and other events in 
ways that fertility and mortality are not. Although many of the social and 
economic factors affecting migration trends are reasonably well known, no 
broadly accepted theoretical framework can be readily applied in a projections 
framework (Howe and Jackson, 2005). Further, this component has proved quite 
difficult to measure even in historical analyses (Passel, 2001; Robinson, 2001). 
Total 
immigration 
(legal plus 
unauthorized) 
has shown a 
steady 
upward trend 
since the 
1930s, 
regardless of 
the period 
measured—
the last 25, 
50 or 
75 years. 
Annual 
immigration 
has grown by 
about 4% per 
year since the 
early 1950s 
to the point where average gross annual immigration for 1995–2005 exceeded 
1.6 million. Even with a significant drop during 2002–2004, possibly due to an 
economic slowdown and heightened security concerns, total immigration for 
2000–2005 averaged almost 1.5 million per year (Passel and Suro, 2005). 
(Figure A1) 
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During the long period of immigration growth, immigration increased more 
rapidly than the total population, which averaged 1.2% annual growth over the 
entire period. As a result, the migration rate (defined as number of immigrants 
during a period per 1,000 population at the beginning) increased steadily.  For 
1930–1945, the migration rate was only 0.5 per 1,000, but by 1990–2005 it 
exceeded six immigrants per 1,000 population.  
Growth in the scale of immigration can be linked to a number of factors. Major 
legislative changes in 1965, 1976, 1980 and 1990 greatly expanded legal 
immigration.10  Unauthorized migration began to increase in the 1970s as a result 
of, among other factors, the United States ending a key temporary worker 
program with Mexico, changes in Mexican society and its economy, and 
increased entry to the U.S. by foreign nationals as temporary residents or tourists. 
Large and increasing numbers of unauthorized migrants began to settle 
permanently in the U.S. with their families, replacing what in previous decades 
had largely been circular temporary migration from Mexico. The buildup of a 
significant undocumented population led to the passage in 1986 of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This law had two major 
provisions—one that legalized about 2.6 million formerly illegal immigrants and 
a second that made it illegal for employers knowingly to hire unauthorized 
migrants. By the mid-1990s, however, the unauthorized population was growing 
rapidly. In 2006, an estimated 11.5 million to 12 million illegal immigrants were 
living in the United States, compared with 3 million to 5 million at the passage of 
IRCA 20 years earlier (Passel, 2006).  
As the U.S. economy expanded rapidly in the late 1990s, large numbers of 
workers arrived, some as legal immigrants, many as unauthorized migrants and 
increasing numbers as legal temporary workers (Passel and Suro, 2005). In 
addition, larger numbers of people came to the United States for tourism or 
business purposes as part an increasingly globalized economy. Even though only 
a small fraction of the visitors settled in the United States as unauthorized 
migrants (i.e., “overstayers”), the numbers eventually reached significant levels—
about 4 million to 5.5 million by 2005 (Passel, 2006a).  Relatively easy and 
inexpensive international communication and travel facilitated the settlement of 
both legal and unauthorized migrants in the U.S.  Although immigration to the 
U.S. has been trending upward for 75 years, most of the factors affecting current 
immigration have their roots within the last 25 to 35 years and point to this period 
as a basis for projecting immigration into the future. 
                                                     
10 Other key legislation dealt with legal immigration in 1952, 1996 and 2001, but these laws did not markedly affect the 
overall numbers (Fix and Passel, 1994; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000: Appendix 1). 
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Legal and Net Unauthorized Immigration 
Setting the assumptions for projected immigration involved two basic steps: 
(1) determining the level of current immigration to use as a launch point; and 
(2) setting a trajectory for the future course of immigration.  The projection 
involves assumptions for the combined level of legal immigration and 
unauthorized migration. Emigration of legal immigrants is measured as a separate 
component, described below.  Unauthorized migration, however, has been 
measured only as a net figure historically. Thus, the projection assumptions are 
formed for the total of legal in-migration and net unauthorized migration.  
Current Immigration (2000–2010) 
Total immigration for 2000–2005 was 7.4 million—an amount consistent with the 
increase in the total population from 281.6 million in 2000 to 295.7 million in 
2005, and in the foreign-born population from 31.2 million to 35.5 million. 
However, within this period, there was considerable variability in annual 
immigration. Data from the March supplements to the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) and other sources showed that annual immigration for 2002–2003 was 20% 
to 30% lower than the peak values attained in 1998–2000 (Passel and Suro, 2005). 
After this marked drop in immigration, more recent data show a strong tendency 
toward recovery to the pre-boom immigration levels of the early 1990s. These 
analyses point to a value for 2005 legal and unauthorized immigration of slightly 
less than 1.4 million and an upward trend for 2004–2007. Combining this estimate 
with growth rates extrapolated from data for 1992–2004 gives a figure for 
immigration in 2005–2010 of just less than 7.1 million. 
This immigration total for 2005–2010 is very slightly lower than the measured 
value for 1990–1995.  In terms of the migration rate, the 2005–2010 estimate is 
4.8 per 1,000, which is almost exactly the average for the five-year rates from 
1970–1975 through 2000–2005. This migration rate is the starting point for 
projecting immigration over the 2010–2050 period.  
Projected Immigration (2005–2050) 
Ideally, immigration would be projected in a model-based framework with an 
underlying theoretical foundation using high quality data on the history of 
immigration and its determinants. Unfortunately, in spite of a considerable 
amount of recent research, virtually none of these items exists in a suitable form. 
There is a reasonable set of historic estimates of the total amount of immigration 
to the U.S. over the last 100 years or so. (See below for a description of how some 
of the key elements have been estimated.) Some recent work commissioned by 
the Social Security Administration brings together the literature on migration 
theory and migration determinants to address the issue of modeling and projecting 
immigration (Howe and Jackson, 2005; Jackson, 2006) and identifies six broad 
theoretical frameworks that could be used to develop projection models: 
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1. Policy framework—national immigration policy determines levels of 
immigration 
2. Neoclassical framework—in a global labor market, labor will migrate 
toward higher wages if the wage differential is larger than the moving 
cost 
3. World systems framework—immigration occurs when countries are 
incorporated in a global free market system; attitudinal shifts, 
remittances and community effects lead to “cumulative causation” and 
increasing levels of immigration 
4. New economics framework—extended family economic units participate 
in a series of decisions and moves to maximize income, diversify 
income sources and insure against risk 
5. Social network framework—networks of kin and other social contacts in 
both sending and receiving areas reduce costs and risks of migration, 
facilitating movement and settlement; momentum develops over time 
to increase migration 
6. Dual labor market framework—segmentation of labor market in receiving 
countries sets up niches for immigrants and encourages migration. 
Only the policy framework points to potential decreases in net immigration.  
Over the long history where immigration to the U.S. has been measured (1820–
2006), the migration rate11 has averaged 4.4 immigrants per year per 1,000 U.S. 
residents. This estimate averages periods of very high immigration (e.g., 1850–
1855 with a rate of 16.5 and 1905–1910 with a rate of 12.1) and periods of very 
low immigration (e.g., 1930–1950, when the rate was 0.3–0.7). For the period 
since major immigration reform was enacted in 1965, the migration rate has 
averaged 4.6 and since 1980, it has averaged 5.4.  
Either of these historic time scales (40 or 25 years) offers a reasonable basis for 
extrapolating into the future. Major immigration reform in 1965 ushered in a new 
era of migration from virtually all parts of the world to the United States; a new 
migration regime encompassing significant numbers of unauthorized migrants 
reached maturity in the 1975–1985 period. As discussed above, the annual 
estimated migration rate of 4.8 immigrants per 1,000 population for 2005–2010 
falls comfortably near the middle of the rates experienced over this time and 
represents a realistic launch value for the projections. 
                                                     
11 Calculated for five-year periods. 
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The immigration assumption for a population projection can be implemented in 
many different ways. The migration rate is one such formulation, but future 
immigration levels would then depend on the exact implementation of other 
assumptions about fertility, mortality and even other migration components. 
Specifying future levels of immigration rather than future rates offers some 
advantages in programming of the projections; however, as noted above, the 
migration rate has some conceptual advantages. Accordingly, the immigration 
assumption for these Pew projections specifies the levels of immigration for each 
future period but in such a way as to maintain a relationship to the expected 
migration rate—that is, allowing immigration to change in concert with the 
population growth to maintain an approximately constant migration rate. To meet 
these conditions, immigration is assumed to increase by 5% from one five-year 
period to the next so that the migration rate will stay very close to the starting 
value of 4.8 and so that the assumption can be implemented easily within the 
context of the projection technology. With this assumption, immigration is 
projected to increase smoothly from 7.1 million (or just over 1.4 million per year) 
for the 2005–2010 period to 10.4 million (or just under 2.1 million per year) for 
2045–2050. (See Figure 3.) 
Historical Immigration (1960–2005) 
Because previous analysis has uncovered problems with some of the historical 
measures, especially for the 1980s and 1990s (Passel, 2004), development of an 
accurate and consistent time series of data for legal immigration and net 
unauthorized immigration required application of the multigenerational projection 
methods and an iterative approach. First, historical measures of total net 
immigration (i.e., the components listed above) were developed by five-year 
period for 1960–2005 from Census Bureau and other official data sources. One 
major issue in creating this data series was the treatment of the large number of 
legal immigrants who acquired legal status under IRCA.  The vast majority of 
these 2.6 million legal immigrants appear in official admission statistics when 
they received their “green cards” or during fiscal years 1989–1991.  In reality, 
most arrived in the U.S. between 1970 and 1986.  In our historical data series for 
immigration, they are assigned to actual periods of arrival, not to the 1989–1991 
period.   
Then, preliminary “projections” were done for each historical census to the next 
to assess the accuracy of the immigration figures for estimating the foreign-born 
population at the second census date; e.g., the foreign-born population from the 
1960 Census was “projected” to 1970 using the initial estimates of immigration 
and then compared with the foreign-born population in the 1970 Census. To the 
extent that the projected population diverged from the population at the second 
census date, adjustments were made in the net immigration component. The 
projections were rerun until the immigration components agreed with the series of 
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population data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses and the 2005 
estimates derived from the Current Population Survey. Similar methods were used 
by Passel and Edmonston (1994) to generate a consistent set of immigration 
measures for 1900 through 1960. 
This approach yields estimates of the components of immigration that are 
consistent with the foreign-born (and Puerto Rican-born) population by 
age-sex-race/ethnicity for the 1960–2005 period. Significant revisions to the 
existing “official” estimates of immigration12 were required. For 1960–1970, the 
revised measure of immigration is about 15%, or 500,000 less than the previously 
used estimates.13  For 1970–1980, the methods imply additional immigration of 
about 1 million, or 15% more than the previous estimates; this amount was added 
to net unauthorized migration.  Larger numeric increases in the assumed levels of 
immigration are required for each of the next two decades—2.0 million in the 
1980s and 3.3 million in the 1990s. Although immigration has grown with each 
decade, these revisions amount to significant changes in estimates of unauthorized 
migration—about one-quarter for the 1980s and one-third for the 1990s. While 
these changes are large, these levels of immigration must have occurred if the 
census and survey measures of the foreign-born population are to be consistent 
with immigration flows. 
Emigration 
Emigration of legal immigrants has proved to be another elusive component of 
population change. The measures used in the historical analysis incorporate 
revised measures based on variations of “residual” calculations using successive 
censuses to incorporate the detailed census figures on the foreign-born population. 
(See Passel, 2004, for a detailed description of the estimation methodology.) For 
each five-year period from 1960 through 2005, a set of emigration rates was 
developed relating the revised measures of emigration to estimates of the 
foreign-born population.  
The emigration measures developed in this manner show steady increases in the 
number of foreign-born emigrants. However, much of the increased level of 
emigration seems to be related to the sizable increase in the population “at risk” of 
emigrating, i.e., the foreign-born population over the 1960–2005 period. Although 
the number of emigrants has increased, rates of emigration have decreased. In the 
1960s about 1.6 million former immigrants left the country, representing rates of 
about 7% for each five-year period. For the 1995–2005 decade, emigration was 
                                                     
12 To the extent that there are “official” estimates of total immigration, they appear as components of change in Census 
Bureau population estimates and demographic estimates used to measure census undercount (e.g., Robinson, 2001). 
13 In practice, this change was implemented by increasing the amount of emigration or out-migration since the estimated 
levels of legal and unauthorized migration are well supported by existing data. 
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more than 2.9 million but the rate of emigration had dropped to roughly 4.5% for 
each five-year period. (See Ahmed and Robinson, 1994, Mulder et al., 2002 and 
Passel, 2004, for previous research on this topic.) 
Because of the relationship between foreign-born population size and emigration, 
the projection methodology used here employs a set of emigration rates applied to 
the foreign-born population rather than a fixed amount of migration out of the 
country by former immigrants. Since the historical data show steadily decreasing 
rates of emigration (even with increasing amounts of emigration out of the 
country), emigration rates within each racial ethnic group are assumed to decline 
in the projection, but at a decreasing rate, reaching slightly more than 2.5% 
overall for 2045–2050. With these rates, emigration amounts in the main 
projection increase from about 3.1 million in the 2000s to just under 4 million in 
the 2040s. 
Remaining Immigration Components 
Net Movement from Puerto Rico 
Measuring movement between Puerto Rico and the U.S. is necessary in 
accounting for changes in the U.S. population.  As included in Census Bureau 
estimates and projections, this movement is generally positive (i.e., into the 
United States) for children and for adults up to about age 35. For older ages, the 
component is generally negative, reflecting the propensity of former migrants to 
return to Puerto Rico after a period of time in the United States. The official 
estimates were incorporated as initial estimates into projections for 1960–2005. 
The iterative procedure described above for the immigration component showed 
that the Census Bureau’s age and sex structure was essentially correct but that the 
level of movement into the U.S. had to be nearly doubled—from about 600,000 
for 1960–2005 to 1.1 million—to account for growth in the Puerto Rican-born 
population living in the United States. For the Pew projections, the initial value 
for 2005–2010 is set to the average level for 1995–2005 and is assumed to 
increase at the same rate as overall immigration—by 5% for each subsequent 
five-year period.14  
“Other” Immigration 
The “Other Immigration” components are mostly small relative to the legal 
immigration, net unauthorized migration, and emigration—amounting to 300,000 
to 500,000 per decade. They are: Net Change in Temporary Foreign Residents 
(called “Net Change in Foreign Students” for 1960–1980 by the Census Bureau); 
Net Movement of Civilian Citizens; Net Recruits and Deaths to the Armed Forces 
                                                     
14 Most of the movement encompassed by this component represents Hispanics moving to the U.S. from Puerto Rico. 
However, there are small amounts for specific races representing movement from other outlying areas. 
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Overseas; and Emigration of U.S. Natives. The latter three mainly affect the 
native population. The first listed component consists entirely of the foreign born, 
however. These components have almost no impact on the historical analyses, but 
data from Census 2000 and the annual March supplements to the Current 
Population Surveys of 1995–2006 suggest that the change in temporary foreign 
residents was seriously underestimated for 1960–1995 and is probably about triple 
the average of 50,000 per five-year period in the official estimates for 1960–
1995.15  For the projections, all of these components for 2005–2010 are set to 
their average values for 1995–2005 and then assumed to increase by 5% in each 
subsequent five-year projection period. 
Alternative Immigration Scenarios 
Immigration levels are almost certain to fluctuate in the future and diverge from 
the baseline assumption. To encompass a reasonable range of alternatives for 
future immigration and to assess their impact on future population, two alternative 
scenarios were developed—one with higher levels of immigration and one with 
lower levels. In the higher-immigration scenario, all immigration components 
(except emigration rates) are set to 150% of the values in the baseline or main 
scenario. In the lower-immigration scenario, all of these components are set to 
50% of the baseline values. For both the higher- and lower-immigration scenarios, 
emigration rates remain at the values projected for the baseline scenario. 
Contribution of Immigration to Population Change 
The contribution of immigration to population growth goes beyond the numbers 
of immigrants added to the population because once the immigrants have arrived 
in the country, many give birth to children in the U.S. In the long run, the 
immigrants themselves will die, but their U.S.-born offspring will have children 
themselves, followed by grandchildren and subsequent generations. The use of a 
population projection methodology permits measurement of future contributions 
of immigrants to long-run population growth as well as an assessment of the role 
of past immigration in population change.  
In measuring the contribution of future immigration to the projected population in 
2050 (or any other future date), an alternative population projection is carried out 
in which the various immigration components (i.e., legal immigration, net 
unauthorized immigration and “other” immigration) are set to zero. With this 
assumption, not only are no future immigrants added to the population, but there 
are no other contributions from these immigrants to population change through 
future births, deaths or emigration16 as all of these components are computed by 
                                                     
15 This component mainly affects the Asian population.  
16 Emigration rates are not set to zero because persons in the starting population will still emigrate during the projection 
horizon. 
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applying rates to the population. The difference between the “zero immigration” 
projection and the baseline projection represents the contribution of future 
immigrants to future population change. 
Following the work of Passel and Edmonston (1994), this same methodology can 
be used to assess the contribution of past immigration to past population change 
because the time series of historical populations has been developed with a 
population projection methodology. Thus, past immigration can be set to zero and 
a “projection” carried out to estimate what would have happened had there been 
no immigrants during the entire 1960–2005 period or during intervals within the 
period. This methodology works because the time series of population change has 
been reconstructed using a projection methodology based on rates of fertility, 
mortality and emigration rather than past numbers of births, deaths and emigrants. 
Fertility 
Projected Fertility, 2005–2050 
The generational pattern of fertility 
for racial/ethnic groups is drawn 
from analysis of recent data from 
the June Fertility Supplements of 
the CPS for 1994–2004 and the 
historical analyses described 
below.  Historical total fertility 
rates (TFR, defined as a measure of 
lifetime births per woman) of 
1960–2004 for the first generation 
exceed the third-and-higher 
generations (for all racial/ethnic 
groups except blacks), with the 
second generation falling either 
roughly between the extremes or 
close to the level of the 
third-and-higher generations. This 
pattern is maintained throughout 
the projection horizon. (Figure A2) Over time, TFRs are assumed to move toward 
2.0 (i.e., with increases for whites and Asians, decreases for the other groups) 
with a significantly faster rate of change for 2005–2025 than for 2025–2050. This 
assumption follows those used by the Census Bureau (2000, 2004) in recent 
projections. (Note that the ultimate TFRs are not forced to any specific value.)  
This series of complex assumptions involving some TFRs series trending upward 
and some downward with differences by race and generation ultimately results in 
little overall movement of the TFR, with total projected TFRs falling in a very 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050 44 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
narrow range of 1.99 to 2.03 for the entire 2005–2050 period.  Notwithstanding 
the more complex methodology, this result is very similar to the overall 
assumption made by the Social Security Trustees (2007) in their projections 
which do not incorporate any differences by race/ethnicity.  The Social Security 
assumptions, based on global assumptions about fertility, were strongly endorsed 
by the 2007 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (TPAM, 2008).  
The overall TFR for Hispanics fell rapidly from 4.7 in the first half of the 1960s 
to 3.4 in the second. By 2005, the Hispanic TFR dropped further to 2.5 children 
per woman. This value is higher than for any of the race groups; white and Asian 
TFRs are about 1.8 and the black TFR is about 2.2. The higher rate for Hispanic 
women is, in large part, due to the relatively high fertility of Hispanic immigrants 
who have a TFR of about 2.8. Fertility rates are assumed to decrease overall by 
2050, with Hispanic fertility for the 2040s reaching slightly more than 2.1. Part of 
the drop can be attributed to a higher share of native-born women in the 
childbearing ages by the 2040s.  
Historical Fertility, 1960–2005 
The first step in analyzing fertility for the projections was the development of a 
set of generational total fertility rates for each racial/ethnic group consistent with 
the historical data. The TFRs are constrained to meet a number of conditions: 
(1) the total number of births in each period17  must agree with totals of registered 
births from the National Center for Health Statistics—by racial/ethnic group, 
when available; (2) survivors of the births that occurred in the 10 years before a 
census must equal the totals for the population under age 10 at the next census; 
and (3) the generational distribution of the survivors under age 10 must agree with 
the estimated population at the census, when available. An initial set of 
race/ethnic generational TFRs was developed from patterns in the June Fertility 
Supplements to the CPS for 1994–2004 and a similar set of TFRs estimated by 
Passel and Edmonston (1994) for 1960–1990. 
In implementing the multigeneration projection methodology, a “G-matrix” is 
required to distribute the births of mothers in each generation to a generation for 
the children. Births to immigrant mothers go into the second generation, and all 
births to Puerto Rican-born women go into the Puerto Rican parentage population. 
For the second and third-and-higher generations, some births are distributed back 
to the second generation as a result of cross-generational childbearing of mixed 
couples made up of first and second generations or first and third-and-higher 
generations. This matrix is estimated for each race group using data on 
exogamous couples from the Current Population Surveys for 1995–2000. 
Analysis of the initial G-matrices showed a strong relationship between the 
                                                     
17 Ten-year periods between censuses covering 1960–2000 and the five-year period from April 2000 through March 2005. 
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percentage of cross-generational births and the relative sizes of the generations. 
Accordingly, this relationship is built into the historical analyses and prospective 
projections to allow for dynamic changes in cross-generational marriage patterns. 
Mortality 
Age-sex-specific mortality rates for race groups in the prospective projection are 
drawn directly from Census Bureau (2000) projections; the same mortality rates 
are applied to all generations within a racial/ethnic group. Life expectancy at birth 
overall increases from 74.9 years for males in 2005 to 81.2 in 2050; for females, 
the change is from 80.7 to 86.7. These improvements are greater than those 
assumed in the Social Security Trustees’ (2007) projections; its assumed values 
for life expectancy at birth in 2050 are 83.5 years for women and 79.4 years for 
men. The Census Bureau’s assumptions, adopted wholesale for the Pew 
projections, are much closer to the recommendations of the technical panel 
(TPAM, 2008) than are the Social Security assumptions.    
Life 
expectancy 
at birth for 
Hispanic 
men is 
projected 
to increase 
from 
77.8 years 
in 2005 to 
83.0 years 
in 2050. 
For 
Hispanic 
women, 
the 
projected 
change is 
from 
84.3 years 
to 88.4.  At each date for both sexes, Hispanic life expectancy at birth is exceeded 
only by that of Asians. (Figure A3) 
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Definitions and Initial Census-Based Populations: 1960–2005 
Racial/Ethnic Groups 
The projections and historical analysis use five mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
race groups: Hispanic; white, not Hispanic; black, not Hispanic; American 
Indian/Alaska Native, not Hispanic; and Asian/Pacific Islander, not Hispanic. The 
basic population distributions are constructed from decennial census data for 
1960–2000 and official population estimates for 2005. The 
age-sex-racial/ethnic-generation data were developed initially from tabulations of 
microdata obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) 
project. For 2005, the initial age-sex-race/ethnic distributions are from the Census 
Bureau’s population estimates with generational information from the March 
2005 CPS. None of the data sources provided complete information along all of 
the dimensions. Accordingly, initial approximations to the detailed distributions 
were developed and adjusted through an iterative process to produce population 
distributions consistent with the available data on the components of change and 
vice versa. 
Hispanic Origin 
The Hispanic population can be identified with the Hispanic origin variable as 
collected (without modification) in census data for 1990 and 2000 and in CPS 
data from 1995 onward. For 1980, there was a small amount of misreporting of 
Hispanic origin; the initial population for the historical analysis is based on a 
corrected version of these data developed by using additional information 
including data on ancestry, place of birth, surname, language and ethnicity of 
other household members. The net effect of the modification is to reduce the size 
of Hispanic population in 1980 by about 3%, or 400,000 persons. 
The Hispanic origin variable in 1970 suffered from both a major overstatement in 
some categories and a rather serious overall understatement. The responses in the 
census showed about 1.5 million persons choosing the “Central or South 
American” category, whereas tests in the 1969 and 1971 Current Population 
Surveys showed about 1 million fewer. Further analyses of these data showed that 
the overstatement was most severe in central and southern states of the country, 
suggesting a complete misinterpretation of the question on the part of a large 
number of respondents. At the same time, the total from the Hispanic origin 
question was at least 500,000 lower than other measures of the Hispanic 
population, notwithstanding the roughly 1 million overstatement just noted. 
For 1970, the Hispanic population for historical analysis was constructed using 
information in the census on place of birth, mother’s and father’s place of birth, 
mother tongue, Spanish surname, current residence, residence five years ago, 
mother tongue of parent(s), grandparents’ place of birth and the same information 
about other household members. The final estimate of the Hispanic population in 
Pew Research Center   February 11. 2008 
U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050 47 
1970 was adjusted to ensure consistency with the historic data series through an 
iterative process involving forward projections to 1980 and backward 
“projections” to 1960.  
The 1960 Census did not include a variable directly identifying persons of 
Hispanic origin. The methods used to identify Hispanics in the 1970 data were 
also applied to 1960. Some minor adjustments were required because less 
information was available in 1960 for U.S. natives. 
Race                          
Methods for classifying individuals by race and collecting racial information in 
the census have changed several times during the period covered by this analysis. 
Production of a consistent set of information in which all non-Hispanic persons 
are assigned to one of the four major race groups required some adjustments and 
modifications to each census and to the CPS for 2001 and later. In the censuses of 
1970–2000, some persons did not choose one of the major races but opted for 
something different, resulting in assignment of “some other race.” For 1980–
2000, the Census Bureau developed procedures to reclassify these individuals and 
released aggregated data by age-sex-race/Hispanic origin on so called “modified” 
race groups in which all persons were assigned to the major races. A variant on 
these procedures was applied here to the IPUMS data. Specifically, individuals 
who were initially classified as “other” were reassigned into one of the four major 
groups on the basis of (in order): race of parent(s), place of birth, ancestry (first 
and second), language spoken in the home, race of other household members and, 
if needed, then a default assignment as white.  
In the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, there was no overarching category corresponding 
to the Asian/Pacific Islander race group used in the 1980 Census and later data. 
These earlier censuses included some specific “race” groups, such as Chinese and 
Japanese, but no global category. Further, according to the definitions of the time, 
persons from South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) were classified as “white.” 
To bring these censuses in line with the subsequent ones, an “Asian” category was 
created from the reported data on race and the variables listed above used to 
assign Hispanic origin. After these assignments were done, a small number of 
individuals remained in the residual “other race” category. These were assigned to 
major race groups using a hierarchical procedure similar to that developed for 
1980 and later. 
Beginning with the 2000 Census and the 2001 CPS, individuals were permitted to 
choose more than one racial group. While only a small percentage of the 
non-Hispanic population chose two or more races (1.9% of non-Hispanics in 
Census 2000 and 1.8% in the 2006 American Community Survey or ACS), more 
than 4 million individuals were counted as multiracial. Individuals choosing more 
than one race were reassigned to one of the five race/Hispanic groups using a 
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hierarchical system: Hispanics; black; Asian or Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific 
Islander; white; and then American Indian/Alaska Native. 
Generation 
The historical analyses and projections use five generation groups: 
Foreign-born Population or First Generation—individuals born outside the 
United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth. 
Puerto Rican-born Population—U.S. citizens (at birth) born in Puerto Rico, 
U.S. territories, or other outlying areas. 
Foreign- and Mixed-Parentage Population or Second Generation—U.S.-born 
citizens with one or both parents born outside the United States (including 
persons born as U.S. citizens in foreign countries with one or two 
foreign-born parents). 
Natives of Puerto Rican Parentage or the Second Puerto Rican Generation—
U.S.-born citizens with one or both parents born in Puerto Rico (including 
persons born as U.S. citizens in foreign countries with one or two Puerto 
Rican-born parents). 
U.S. Natives with Native Parentage or Third-and-higher Generations—
U.S.-born citizens with both parents born in the United States (including 
persons born as U.S. citizens in foreign countries with two U.S.-born 
parents). 
The full array of generations can be obtained directly only from the 1960 and 
1970 Censuses because these two include the questions on nativity, citizenship 
and parents’ places of birth that are required to produce tabulations of these five 
generations. In censuses since 1970, the parental birthplace questions were 
dropped, so the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses can provide direct data only for 
the foreign-born, Puerto Rican-born and native populations; the native population 
encompasses the second generation, natives of Puerto Rican-parentage and the 
third-and-higher generations. For 1980 and 1990, “projections” from 1960 and 
1970 were used to produce an initial approximation to the full five generations. 
The native population at each census date was distributed to the more detailed 
generations using these projections.  
For 2000, CPS data can provide a five-generation distribution by age, sex and 
race. However, these data are subject to substantial sampling variability because 
of the relatively small CPS sample size. So, the final population data for five 
generations in 2000 incorporate information from both the CPS and “projections” 
from 1970 to distribute the native population from Census 2000 to more detailed 
generations. For 2005, the March CPS again provides information for a fully 
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detailed tabulation of five generations by racial/ethnic group. Although the CPS 
sample size was expanded between 2000 and 2005, it is still small. The final 
age-sex-race/ethnic-generation distribution for the population in 2005 represents a 
combination of the projected population from 2000, the March CPS generational 
detail, the official Census Bureau population estimates by age-sex-race/ethnicity 
and information on native/Puerto Rican/foreign populations from the 2005 ACS. 
This estimate for 2005 is the starting population for the projections. 
